Michigan Law Review
Volume 65

Issue 5

1967

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 19 and Indispensable
Parties
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 19 and Indispensable Parties, 65 MICH. L. REV.
968 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol65/iss5/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NOTES
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-Rule 19
and Indispensable Parties
The reformulation of compulsory joinder rules, urged by commentators for a decade,1 has been realized with the 1966 amendment to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to
the amendment, courts consistently held that the absence from the
lawsuit of persons who were "indispensable" deprived the court of
power to adjudicate the action. 2 The amendment to rule 19 is an
effort to establish a methodology which requires a practical consideration of the factual situation at hand when determining the propriety of permitting a case to continue even though certain parties
are not joined. A brief look at the nature and source of the "indispensability of parties" doctrine is needed in order that the purposes
of rule 19 and its supposed effects may be more easily understood.
At common law, parties who possessed joint rights or owed
joint duties under substantive law had to be joined in a single
action. Joinder requirements were considered to be annexed to the
substantive rights of the parties and were thought not to be procedural devices.3 Familiar examples of parties who possessed such
rights were partners, joint tenants, and joint promisees under a contract.4 In equity, on the other hand, another approach to compul~
sory joinder prevailed; in order to avoid multiplicity of actions, all
parties that were "necessary to the complete settlement of the controversy" had to be joined. 5 The rules in equity were applied with
a high degree of flexibility, and while all persons who were interested
in a controversy were to be joined if feasible, such joinder was excused when it was impractical or impossible.6 During the latter part
of the eighteenth century, however, the equity courts began to follow the additional rule, not specifically related to their compulsory
joinder practice, that a decree would not be entered unless it completely disposed of a controversy.7 The result of superimposing this
rule upon the necessary joinder rules applicable in equity actions,
was that the equity courts would refuse to render any decree when!. See Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 CoLuM. L. REv. 1254 (1961); Reed, Compulsory ]oinder of Parties in Civil
Actions (pts.1-2), 55 MICH. L. REv. 327,483 (1957).
2. See, e.g., Young v. Powell, 179 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1950); Caldwell Mfg. Co. v.
Unique Balance Co., 18 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
3. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 56 (2d ed. 1947).

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. See also Bank of California Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516,
106 P.2d 879 (1940).
6. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1255-56.
7. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1273-82.
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ever certain parties could not be joined and this nonjoinder might
give rise to multiple suits.8
From this curious admixture of the joinder rules and equity's
insistence upon the perfect decree grew the distinction between
necessary and indispensable parties.9 While necessary parties were
classified as those "who ought to be present in order to have a complete and just determination,"10 indispensable persons were defined
as those who had an interest in the proceedings of such a nature
that a final decree could not be made "without either affecting that
interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
termination •.. [is] wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience."11 In establishing a test whereby necessary and indispensable parties could be distinguished, the courts turned to the character of the parties' substantive rights and asked whether they were
"severable."12 If the absent party possessed a joint right which was
not severable, he was "indispensable" and the action had to be dismissed unless he could be brought before the court. On the other
hand, if the nature of the substantive right was "severable," the
absentee was deemed to be merely a necessary party and the court,
in its discretion, could proceed without him. Since the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure purported to adopt the flexible equity
8. In essence, Professor Hazard argues that the real equity joinder principle was
the necessary party rule, which required that all parties with material interests be
joined, but which was suspended whenever parties were without the court's jurisdiction. See Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch. 1809).
In Professor Hazard's view, equity's general reluctance to render a decree which did
not completely dispose of a controversy, when applied to the necessary joinder situation, gave rise to the indispensable party concept. See Hazax:d, supra note 1, at 1271-82.
9. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1273-82.
10. The classic definitions of necessary and indispensable parties are set out in
Shields v• .Barrows, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854).
11. Id. at 139.
12. Ibid. For application of the "severable rights" test, see Halpin v. Savannah
River Elec. Co., 41 F.2d 329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930); Sechrist v.
Palshook, 95 F. Supp. 746 (M,D. Pa. 1951); Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. v. Schrack, 27
F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Pa. 1939). See generally Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed
Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1139-40 (1965).
The court in Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936), in setting
out what was to become the standard test for determining who was an indispensable,
in contrast to a necewtry, party, listed these four criteria: (1) whether the interest
of the absent party was distinct and severable; (2) whether in the absence of the
party the court could render justice between the parties; (3) whether the decree
could have an injurious effect on the absent party's interest; and (4) whether the
final determination in the absence of a party was "consistent with equity and good
conscience." If any of the four questions were answered in the negative, the absentee
~as. indispe?sab!e· Repeatedly, courts a~plied this test mechanically and unimagmatively, usmg 1t for the purpose of statmg rather than reaching a result. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1966); McCormick v. Tipton, 259 F.2d 913
(6th Cir. 1958); Sellers v. Bardill, 132 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Ky. 1955). See generally
Reed, supra note 1, at ll55-56; Note, Multiparty Litigation, supra at 1141.
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approach to joinder,13 only the necessary party rule should have
been embraced by rule 19.14 Unfortunately, however, the concept
of indispensable parties was introduced in part (b) of the original
rule 19, which authorized the courts to order persons "who ought
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded" to be joined in
the action if those persons were not indispensable. No effort was
made to establish guidelines for determining who was an indispensable party; apparently that decision was left to be governed by prior
case development.15 Consequently, the courts continued to view indispensability in terms of the "severability" of the parties' substantive rights. 16
Rule 19, as amended, sets out specific criteria on the basis of
which the courts can determine whether a person--described by
the rule as "contingently necessary" 17-should be joined in the
action. However, the cases cited in the Advisory Committee's Note
to rule 19 illustrate that the rule is merely codifying the considerations that have always been crucial in determining whether a party
should be joined18 and thus is embracing the classes of persons
heretofore designated as either "indispensable" or "necessary."19
13. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1319-21
(1935).
14. See note 8 supra.
15. Judge Charles Clark, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules which
drafted the original Federal Rules made the following observation:
In a great number of different instances the only situation where the court
will not go ahead under these provisions is in the case of what are called in
equity indispensable parties, and we felt we could not redefine those terms or
change that situation. I think the whole trend of federal decisions has been to
cut down the number of parties that are considered indispensable, but that is a
matter of judicial decision, rather than for procedural rules.
Quoted in Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Rule 19, 74
YALE L.J. 403, 411 n.34 (1965).
16. See the cases collected in 2 BARRON 8: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE·
DURE §§ 513.1-.11 (Wright ed. 1961); and 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i,r 19.07-.14
(2d ed. 1966).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 provides:
[A person is contingently necessary if]
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest.
For general literature on rule 19 as amended, see Cohn, The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204 (1966); Fink, supra note 15; Wright, Proposed
Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 336-37
(1964); Note, Multiparty Litigation, supra note 12; Comment, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Attacking the Party Problem, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 80 (1965).
18. See generally James, Necessary and Indispensable Parties, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv.
68 (1963); Reed, supra note l; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation, 71
HARv. L. REv. 877 (1958).
19. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 512 (Wright ed. Supp. 1966).
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The innovation in the amended rule is that it no longer treats the
absence of a "contingently necessary" person who cannot be made
a party as grounds for automatic dismissal of the action. The rule as
amended affirmatively states the factors which are relevant for evaluating the propriety of continuing an action in the absence of suc.h
a party: (I) the effect of a judgment on the interests of the present
parties and the absentees; (2) the available methods of avoiding
prejudice to the absentee's interests; (3) the adequacy of the judgment; and (4) the availability of alternative forums. 20 While some
of these factors overlap with those to be considered in deciding
whether a party is "contingently necessary," the others, namely, the
court's ability to shape adequate relief and the availability of an
alternative forum, focus on a separate dimension-the importance
of the plaintiff's right to a forum for a total adjudication of his
claim. 21 Thus, it is clear from the provisions of the new rule and
the comments of the draftsmen that a court now has discretion to
permit a case to continue even though a heretofore so-called "indispensable party" is not joined. The necessary-indispensable dichotomy seems to be abolished by the amended version of rule 19 and
the term "indispensable" is now used only in a conclusive sense-to
describe those parties in whose absence the court decides that proceeding with the action would result in an injustice.22
The first judicial challenge to amended rule 19 was made in
20. Pre-amendment cases also took cognizance of the relevance of such factors. See
the cases cited in the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 19, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-36 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89-94 (1966), 1966 U.S. ConE CONG,
&: An. NEWS 779-84. The cases are listed in Fink, supra note 15, at 426-27 n.87.
21. See New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. .Brandenburg, 8 F.R.D. 151, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), where the court observed: "If the suit is dismissed, a wrong may be done to the
plaintiff•••• In such a situation, the equities of the parties is the basic consideration."
See also, e.g., Stumpf v. Fidelity Gas Co., 294 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1961); Zwack v. Kraus
Bros., 237 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1956). If some type of relief can be administered to
the plaintiff individually, the court will render that type of decree. See Tardan v.
California Oil Co., 323 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1963); Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 983 (1950). See also Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1966). The availability of
another forum where all the parties can be brought in may be sufficient to authorize
dismissal. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Haynes, 241 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1957); Fouke v.
Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234,236 (5th Cir. 1952); American Ins. Co. v. .Bradley Mining Co.,
57 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Cal. 1944). A recent case, Pettengill v. United States, 253 F. Supp.
321 (N.D. Ill. 1966), decided prior to the date upon which the new rule took effect, but
nevertheless applying the intent of the amendment, shows the type of analysis that is
promoted by consideration of the plaintiff's right to an adjudication:
If I find the Florida heir dispensable, the Government must defend three suits.
The same defense should se1!'e all three cases. If I find her indispensable, the
taxpayers are completely depnved of any remedy•••• [T]he practical considerations ••• weigh more heavily in favor of the dispensability of the Florida heir
than in favor of her indispensability.
Id. at 324.
22. But see Cohn, supra note 17, at 1211. Professor Cohn fears that courts will
continue to use the term "indispensable" as a link to the original rule and its
anachronistic concepts.
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Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Co.,23 wherein the Third Circuit held that the indispensable party doctrine is a rule of substantive law which cannot be
altered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 That rule 19
cannot accomplish changes in the substantive law is clear from the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 which grants to the Supreme Court of
the United States the "power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and
procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions" 25
and which further provides that "such rules shall not abridge,. enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 26 The perimeter of this
limitation has been marked out by a number of Supreme Court
decisions which suggest that a rule may regulate only the judicial
processes for the enforcement of rights and duties recognized by
the substantive law.27 The test, easily articulated, becomes more
difficult in application. In one sense, party-joinder may be thought
to be strictly "procedural" in that it is concerned with the judicial
administration and management of the litigation of a claim and
thus falls within the sphere of federal rule-making power. The policies underlying all types of joinder-claims, remedies, and parties-are to avoid multiple litigation and to allow parties to have their
disputes adjudicated more conveniently and inexpensively at a judicial forum. Moreover, the judge-made doctrines of "indispensability"
are largely self-imposed by courts to effectuate fundamental ideas
23. 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), 80 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1967), discussed in text
accompanying notes 30-44 infra.
24. See Fink, supra note 15, at 430-33. Professor Fink relies heavily on the statement
of Judge Aldrich in Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.7 (1st Cir. 1964), that "what
are indispensable parties is a matter of substance, not procedure."
25. 62 Stat. 961 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). See generally Gavits,
State Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 24 (1949); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1
and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard
Doctrine, 65 MICH, L. REV. 613, 738-46 (1967); Sunderland, Character and Extent of the
Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21
A.B.A.J. 404, 406-07 (1935); Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its
Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936); Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power
of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1934); Williams, The Source
of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459 (1937).
26. 62 Stat. 961 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
27. In Sibbach v. Wilson 8e Co., 312 U.S. I, 14 (1941), it was held that "the test must
be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recoguized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them." In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1945), the Court said: "Congress' prohibition of any
alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure
upon the rights of litigants." In discussing the applicability of federal rules in diversity
of citizenship cases, the Supreme Court, in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
indicated that the rule-making power was not invalid merely because it altered the
enforcement of state-created rights. Id. at 473-74. See also Miller, supra note 25,
at 744-46.
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of fairness when settling disputes among litigants'. However, despite
these over-arching considerations, it cannot be denied that historically there was a close nexus between the substantive rights of the
parties and compulsory joinder.28 Nonetheless, this relationship
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such joinder is a
matter of "substance" for Enabling Act purposes. Closely analogous
to the compulsory joinder situation is the impleader proceeding
authorized by rule 14. Just as in the case of compulsory joinder,
an understanding of the substantive rights of the parties under state
law is preliminary to any application of rule 14 since impleader is
contingent upon the existence of a right of indemnity under local
law. Although the validity of the impleader rule has never been
subjected to a direct challenge based upon the limitations on the
rule-making power, there is dictum in one opinion that rule 14 is
properly within the scope of that power.29 Thus, the mere linkage
of state-created substantive rights with procedural methods for enforcement of those rights does not automatically require a conclusion that such procedure is incorporated as part of the substantive
law.
A second factor to be considered in attempting to circumscribe
the domain of procedural rules is the impact of a particular practice on the rights of litigants; indeed, it was essentially this line of
approach which was used by the Third Circuit in reaching its decision in Provident Tradesmens. The court relied on an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit, Perry v. Allen,30 in which the provision
of rule 25(a)(l) requiring substitution within two years after the
death of a party was held invalid as an attempt to impose a statute
of limitations. The Perry court supported its decision on the ground
that the rule attempted to abridge the appellant's substantive right to
bring his civil action to trial on the merits. Whether such a right
exists absolutely is open to question, 31 but the Third Circuit in
Provident Tradesmens accepted the Perry court's statement at face
value. Provident Tradesmens was an action for a declaratory judgment as to whether the coverage of an insurance policy issued by
the defendant to one Dutcher, the owner of the automobile, extended to another person who had been driving the automobile at
the time of the accident. In the earlier wrongful death action against
the driver's estate, the defendant insurance company had refused
28. See notes 3-13 supra and accompanying text.
29. See D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958), where the
court said: "It must be recognized that the third-party impleader practice provisions
promulgated by the Supreme Court in Rule 14 ••• may rationally be regarded as
dealing with a procedural subject matter and therefore Rule 14 falls within the
authority delegated to the Supreme Court." Id. at 910.
l!O. 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
31. See Note, 45 CAI.IF. L. REv. 785 (1957); Note, 70 HAll.v. L. REv. 1471 (1957);
Note, 105 u. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1957).
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to defend the action, contending that the driver had not been acting within the scope of his permitted use of the automobile. After
a default judgment was entered in the wrongful death action, this
declaratory judgment proceeding was commenced, but Dutcher, the
policyholder, was not joined.32 The trial court's directed verdict in
favor of the plaintiff driver's estate was reversed by the Third Circuit, which held, sua sponte,33 that the action must be dismissed for
failure to join Dutcher. Since the insurance policy was one which
provided for a set amount of coverage, the Third Circuit viewed
Dutcher's interest in the policy as adverse to that of the plaintiff
and "affected" by any decree entered by the court. Therefore, the
court concluded that Dutcher was indispensable and that it could
not proceed to a final judgment in his absence. In evaluating the
effect of amended rule 19 on the case, the court said:
The indispensable party doctrine is not procedural. It declares substantive law and accords a substantive right to a person to be joined
as a party to an action when his interest or rights may be affected
by its outcome. The indispensable party doctrine is beyond the
reach of, and not affected by, Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . .34
Obviously, the court has applied the suggestion made by one
commentator that rule 19 should be interpreted in such a manner
that the concept of indispensable parties is not affected. 35 However,
the notes and memoranda from the Advisory Committee's proceedings make it abundantly clear that the rule was amended with the
primary intention of mitigating the harsh results fl.owing from the
application of the indispensable parties rule.36 In effect, therefore,
32. The estate of the deceased driver of the second vehicle and an injured passenger
sued the defendant insurance company and the insured Dutcher in separate state
court actions.
33. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(2) provides that a defense of failure to join an indispensable
party may be made "In any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7a, or by
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits." This would
indicate that if the question is raised on appeal, after a trial and jury verdict, it is
raised too late. See also :Benger Labs., Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 24 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. Pa.
1959).
34. 365 F.2d at 805. It is noteworthy that in Erie contexts the Third Circuit has
consistently held that the rule of indispensability to be applied in a diversity case is
that of the state. See Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950); Valley Forge Golf Club v. L. G. De Felice &: Son, 124
F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pa. 1954). However, in Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.C. 949 (1960), the Second Circuit
made it clear that the substance-procedure analysis employed in diversity litigation
under Erie does not apply in determining the scope of the Rules Enabling Act.
35. See Fink, supra note 15, at 425-28. In Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir.
1964), Judge Aldrich interpreted the omission of any reference to "indispensable
parties" in the new rule as consistent with the view that indispensability is a matter
of substance and not procedure; he therefore limited the proposed new rule to clarifying the grounds for proceeding where "necessary" parties could not be joined.
36. See Advisory Committe Note to Federal Rule 19, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong.,
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as the dissent in Provident Tradesmens points out, the majority in
that case is striking down Federal Rule 19 as invalid and beyond
the scope of the Enabling Act.37
The majority in Provident Tradesmens focused on the "substantive" right of an absent·party to be joined when his interests
may be "affected by the decree." 38 Professor Hazard, in his extensive
analysis of the history of the indispensable party rule, points out
that traditionally, at least in equity, joinder has been looked upon
as a procedural matter.39 In emphasizing that there is no party whose
absence prevents the issuance of a decree, but rather that there
may be a party whose absence prevents the rendering of a complete
decree,40 he should have dispelled all fears that a substantive right
not to have one's interest affected might exist. Moreover, how can
an absentee be said to have a substantive right not to have his interest "affected," when traditional notions of collateral estoppel
and res judicata do not even permit his interest to be legally affected?41 If the court is referring to the factual impact of a decree
on the interests of an absentee, it does not make sense to talk in
terms of a substantive right; for carried to its logical extreme, such
a right would require a court to dismiss a creditor's suit because
a judgment against the debtor would impair his ability to pay others
who were not parties to the litigation.42 Moreover, Federal Rule 19
does not attempt to obliterate any consideration of the absentee's
rights; such a consideration is still a factor for evaluation. In any
case, why should an absentee have a substantive right not to have
his interest affected when he himself has the opportunity to protect
that interest by intervention43 or when the court may be able to
2d Sess. 33-36 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89-94 (1966), 1966 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 779-84. The dissenting opinion in Provident Tradesmens, 365 F.2d at 822,
contains the following explanation of the change in rule 19:
Rule 19 in effect, therefore, is an effort to restate the liberal view which requires a
practical consideration of the circumstances and an effort to shape relief to avoid
injustice rather than the automatic dismissal of the action by applying the label
of "jurisdictional" defect because an interested person was not made a party. The
difference b7tween the old and the new Rule 19 is graphically illustrated in the
change in title. It formerly was entitled "Necessary Joinder of Parties"; it is now
entitled, "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication." Thus, the Committee
has endeavored to emphasize the importance of equitable, discretionary factors.
37. 365 F.2d at 822.
38. The circuit court relied on the district court's ruling that Dutcher was "incompetent" to testify because his interest in the policy was "adverse" to that of the
plaintiffs in that "it appears clearly that the measure of Dutcher's protection under
this policy of insurance is dependent upon the outcome of this suit."
39. Se~ notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text. See also Hazard, supra note I.
But see Fmk, supra note 15, who is not impressed with the law-equity distinction.
40. See Hazard, supra note I, at 1282.
41. See Reed, supra note 1, at 483.
42. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1288-89. See also the dissenting opinion in
Provident Tradesmens, 365 F.2d at 816.
43. See, e.g., Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939).
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shape relief in such a manner that those rights are protected?44
The Third Circuit's concern for an individual's substantive
rights might have been more correctly, or at least more profitably,
focused on the interest of the defendant who was actually before
the court and who might have been prejudiced by the possibility
of inconsistent decisions and multiple liability.45 Because of the particular facts of Provident Tradesmens, the defendant insurance
company may have found itself liable to Dutcher for indemnification of judgments rendered in the state court actions, as well as to
the deceased's estate in the present declaratory judgment action.
Historically, however, protection against multiple liability has always been viewed as an equitable matter and one within the discretion of the court.46 Furthermore, as the dissent in Provident
Tradesmens perspicaciously notes, the evils involved in a race to
collect against the fund can be readily guarded against by a provision in the decree to the effect that the insurer defendant is not
required to make any payment under the policy until Dutcher has
had an opportunity to present any claims that he may have as a result of the state court determinations.47
·
It must also be remembered that the distinction between "substance" and "procedure" rests on shifting grounds, since what may
be classified as "substance" or "procedure" for Enabling Act purposes may not be so categorized for other purposes, notably the Erie
and conflict-of-laws situations. Consequently, rather than attempting
to uncover some objective line of demarcation between "substance"
and "procedure," any judicial inquiry should concentrate on the
purpose for which the distinction is being made.48 In the case of
the federal rule-making power, an insight into the purpose for the
distinction may be gleaned from congressional history, which indicates a desire to leave the Supreme Court free to make rules
"which would regulate all means and facilities which courts make
available to enforce rights, and to limit only the making of those
44. See, e.g., Tardan v. California Oil Co., 323 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1963); Ward v.
Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d
760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950).
45. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), the Supreme
Court intimated that the right to be immune from double liability may be a constitutional right. This idea is explored in Fink, supra note 15, at 421. While the
Western Union case does show a concern for the threat of double liability, the due
process issue may be limited to the situation in which a court's jurisdiction is based on
property within the state.
46. Compare Mahr v. Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 127 N.Y. 452, 28 N.E. 391 (1891), with
Petrogradsky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930).
47. 365 F.2d at 819.
48. Cf. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin
v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). See also Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Con•
fiict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
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rules which would alter the character of rights to be determined
by a final judgment on the merits. " 49
Assuming that Federal Rule 19 can be sustained as within the
scope of the Enabling Act, the rule must still be approved as within
the bounds of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 50 in order to be applied in a
49. Sunderland, supra note 25, at 406. Not only must one recognize that the Advisory
Committee which drafted rule 19 and the Supreme Court which approved the rule
were confident of their power to effect changes in concepts of indispensability, but
also that the New York and Michigan rule-making committees, both limited to
"regulating procedure," had previously formulated liberal joinder provisions which
impinged on anachronistic definitions of indispensable parties. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &:
R. § 1001 (McKinney 1963); Mich. Court Rule 205 (1961). The notion that the "indispensability rule is still preserved" as argued by Fink, supra note 15, at 428, is refuted
in 2 WEINSTEIN, KORN, &: MILLER, N.Y. ADVISORY COMMITI'EE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1001.01 (1965):
[Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules] the practice remains essentially unchanged and well-reasoned precedents holding parties "necessary" are still
useful. This does not mean, however, that courts should dismiss in every case
where previously a party might have been held "indispensable."
The commentary on the Michigan rule is even more explicit. As interpreted in 1
HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS, MICHIGAN CoURT RULES ANNOTATED 552 (1962), the rule alters
previous notions of "indispensable parties":
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, joint obligees were traditionally required
to join in the prosecution of a claim on the obligation•••. Since the presence of
all joint obligees is essential to permit the court to render complete relief, this
joinder requirement will be continued under Rule 205.I.
.
If a joint obligee is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, his absence need not
deter the court from proceeding under sub-rule 205.2. • . • Most frequently the
lack of an alternative remedy if the suit is dismissed will outweigh the possibility
of a multiplicity of suits and resulting harassment of the defendant and the court
if the action proceeds.
As a postscript, it might be noted that FED. R. CIV. P. 19 may be vulnerable to a
challenge that the indispensable parties rule is "jurisdictional" and that, as amended,
rule 19 violates FED. R. CIV. P. 82 by altering jurisdiction. Today, however, that theory
is generally regarded as fallacious. See, e.g., Bry-Man's Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d 585, 587
(5th Cir. 1963); Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 431 (9th Cir. 1936). Much of
the confusion underlying the theory of jurisdictional defect results from the consequences that may occur in diversity situations. See, e.g., Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 423
(1879); Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal&: Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946).
50. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie required a federal court in diversity cases to apply the
substantive law of the state in which it was sitting, whether that law was statutory or
decisional. A more restrictive requirement was authorized in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), where federal courts were bound to look to state law if that law
would significantly affect the outcome of the litigation. The retreat from the outcomedeterminative test was begun with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356
U.S. 525 (1958), where the court stressed the necessity of balancing state and federal
interests in determining whether to apply state or federal law. Most recently in Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Supreme Court appears to have authorized the
application of all federal rules of procedure in diversity cases. The relationship of the
Erie doctrine and various federal "procedural" practices is analyzed in Miller, supra
note 25, at 702-15. For the history of the Erie doctrine as it has evolved, see generally
Clark, ~tate Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53
Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958); Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test To Determine
Those Rules of State Laws To Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 204
(1950); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court, and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); Meador, State Power and the Federal Judicial
Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082 (1963); McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine
Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A. Triple
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diversity case in a federal court.51 Before the redrafting of rule 19,
there was a split of authority as to whether federal or state decisions
were the proper source of law governing the question of indispensability.52 While the issue was never resolved by the Supreme Court,
an illuminating discussion of the problem was presented by the
Fifth Circuit in Kuchenig v. California. 53 In that case, the court
opined that any resolution by it of a conflict between the federal
rule and state practice would be premature since the federal rule
did not specifically speak to the problem in that it did not delineate
any standard of indispensability; the court therefore focused on the
more limited question of whether to consult state or federal precedents in determining indispensability. 54 Now that rule 19 specifically
articulates criteria for deciding whether an action may continue,
the question concerning the source of governing law must be resolved, and the resolution should be made in light of the Supreme
Court's most recent Erie-based decision, Hanna v. Plumer. 55 In
Hanna, the Supreme Court appears to have held that whenever
there is a clash between a federal rule and local practice, the federal
rule applies unless it can be demonstrated that "the Advisory Committee, this Court and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment
Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond:
A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TuL. L. REv. 443 (1962);
Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A
Projection, 48 IOWA L. REv. 248 (1963); Note, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1382 (1966); Note, 51
CORNELL L.Q. 551 (1966); Note, 1966 DUKE L.J. 142; Note, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 345 (1966).
51. See McCoid, supra note 50, at 908 n.114. See also ADVISORY COMMIITEE ON CIVIL
RULES, TENTATIVE PROPOSAL To CLARIFY NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES-RULE 19,
PRELIMINARY MEMO: THE RELEVANCE OF STATE LAW (1962).
52. Federal law governs: Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1961); Green v. Green, 218 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955);
Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 183 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950); Lawrence v. Sun Oil Co.,
166 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1948); De Korwin v. First Nat'! Bank, 156 F.2d 858 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946); Grace v. Carroll, 219 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, 8 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). State
law governs: Strachan v. Nisbet, 202 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1953); Dunham v. Robertson,
198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952); Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760
(3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950); Richmond Lace Works, Inc. v. Epstein,
31 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Campbell v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 148 F. Supp. 209
(D. Idaho 1957); Valley Forge Golf Club v. L. G. De Felice 8c Son, 124 F. Supp. 873
(E.D. Pa. 1954); Baker v. Dale, 123 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Redfern v. Collins,
113 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Tex. 1953); Platte County v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 6
F.R.D. 475 (D. Neb. 1946). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 992.
53. 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 985 (1966).
54. In Kuchenig, the court noted that indispensability was a judicially self-imposed
limitation and therefore was linked with matters of procedure. On the other hand, it
recognized that indispensability controlled whether an action would be dismissed, and
that disparities would directly affect the outcome of an action and therefore encourage
forum-shopping.
55. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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that the rule in question transgresses neither the terms on the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions." 56 This language, if read
literally, would seem to authorize the application in diversity cases
of every federal rule that is legitimately within the scope of the
Enabling Act. However, the problems presented by contrary determinations of indispensability are of a different nature than those
posed by state-federal divergence with respect to the manner of serving process involved in Hanna. Hanna forced the litigant merely
to alter the way in which he serves process and to abide by the
proper rules of the chosen forum. In the case of joinder of indispensable parties, however, the state standards for determining indispensability may be such that the litigant is completely deprived
of any means by which he may avail himself of the state forum. 57
In effect, a state determination of indispensability is analogous to a
"door-closing statute" which causes a difference in outcome at the
very outset of the litigation since it concerns the right of the plaintiff
to have his case heard in the first instance. 58 Consequently, unlike
the effect of the differing practices regarding service of process, the
ability to bring suit in a federal court and the inability to do so in
a state court for reasons of indispensability may well have relevance
to the choice of a forum and raise the sort of equal protection problems posed in Erie. 59 However, there is strong support for the proposition that administrative considerations have dictated the content
of judge-made rules as to when a party is indispensable and that
therefore a federal court should rely upon its own practices in evaluating the propriety of proceeding without a particular party. 60
In view of the doubt concerning the true source of the indispensability rule 61 and its apparent ability to be rationally classified as
56. Id. at 472.
57. See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 888.
58. Cf. Angel v• .Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Compare Arrowsmith v. United
Press Int'I, 320 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1963) (en bane), with Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph
Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 512-16 (2d Cir. 1960).
59. The problem is noted in Kuchenig v. California, 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 985 (1966). See also Miller, supra note 25, at 712-15. At this point,
it is appropriate to note that it is unlikely that sharp collisions with state law will
often arise, since the tests incorporated in amended rule 19 reflect equitable principles
common to the law of all American jurisdictions and embrace the strong discretionary
element running through the entire law of party-joinder, both state and federal. See
ADVISORY CoMMITIEE ON CML RULES, TENTATIVE PROPOSAL, supra note 51.
60. See 2 BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 512 n.21.14; Developments in
the Law, supra note 18, at 888.
61. See Fink, supra note 15, at 431. Professor Fink himself admitted the confusion
surrounding the historical origin of the indispensable party doctrine:
Until we have an adequate theory of what the indispensable parties rule is,
it is hardly possible to determine whether it is a rule of substantive law. It would
seem that the indispensable parties rule is a rule of substantive law if failure to
join an indispensable party goes to the court's "power to render a decree," is a
"fatal error," or is, in itself, a violation of due process of law. On the other hand,
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either "substance" or "procedure," 62 the strong federal policy embraced in rule 19 should prevail.
There would still appear to be a narrow category of cases in
which a federal court could run afoul of Erie. I£ a state were to pass
a statute granting to the plaintiff a particular right of action only
if he joins with him certain other persons,63 a federal court might
be precluded from allowing the action to proceed. 64 However, in
light of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna, in which
he criticizes the majority for sanctifying any legitimately adopted
federal rule of procedure regardless of its impact on a "State's substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens,''65 it is conceivable that even in the extreme situation posed
in the hypothetical, the majority would insist upon preserving the
integrity of the federal rules. In this context, it might be more appropriate to balance the state and federal interests. Thus, assuming
a strong substantive state policy not based on mere judicial administration factors, the state rule should be effectuated. But, absent
such direct and specific clarification by the state, Hanna and the
philosophy it represents purports to teach that federal policies, and
in particular, those bound up with the federal judicial system, are
not to be categorically dismissed in favor of state practice, even to
guarantee identity of result.66 Rule 19 embodies a conclusive federal
attitude toward compulsory joinder in a federal court and this significant federal policy should prevail.67
if joinder requirements are merely means of adjudicating rights, and, within the
confines of fairness which procedural due process always requires, are discretionary
rules ••• then joinder requirements may be thought to be procedural.
Ibid.
62. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), seemed to authorize congressional rulemaking power for those matters which, "though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either," Id.
at 472.
63. That joinder is a matter of state substantive law might be inferred from the
passage of such a statute.
64. See 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 511. This theory is based on
the unstated premise that the Supreme Court, despite the Rules Enabling Act, is impotent to promulgate a rule for diversity cases touching on a matter that a state has
deemed a facet of substantive policy.
65. 380 U.S. at 475-76.
66. See Miller, supra note 25, at 721-22.
67. See Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 19, R.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 33-36 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89-94 (1966), 1966 U.S. ConE CoNG. & An.
NEWS 779-84. See generally Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704
(D. Colo. 1966).

